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“THE TASK OF SISYPHUS? 
BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL TEMPORALITY IN MAURIZIO MELONI’S  
POLITICAL BIOLOGY” 
CHRIS RENWICK 
UNIVERSITY OF YORK  
 
In 1869 Francis Galton (1822-1911) published a book called Hereditary Genius in which he 
argued that human intellectual capacity was inherited much like hair or eye colour. Building 
on a series of more speculative articles four years earlier, the book was the beginning of the 
British eugenics movement. As Galton’s numerous critics pointed out, though, the family 
pedigrees that filled page after page of Hereditary Genius did not demonstrate conclusively 
what he claimed they did: that clever and successful people were often related to other 
clever and successful people because of nature rather than nurture. Galton, however, 
thought he might be able to call on support from his cousin, Charles Darwin, who had a 
tentative new theory of heredity. According to Darwin’s account of “pangenesis”, offspring 
inherited characteristics from their parents via “gemmules”, which were swirling around in 
animal’s bloodstreams (Darwin 1868: 340-404). Enthused by the idea that this theory might 
solve his problems, Galton devised a test and asked Darwin to collaborate. They acquired 
two groups of rabbits – one with white fur, the other black – and swapped their blood, 
reasoning that their offspring’s fur would be a different colour as a result. Within weeks it 
was clear their interventions had made no difference. Nevertheless, the two men carried 
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on, finally bringing their gruesome experiments to an end five years later (Renwick 2012: 53-
6).  
 Galton and Darwin’s enthusiasm for pangenesis was important for a number of 
reasons. The experiments’ failure to yield positive results persuaded Galton to focus on 
proving his argument with statistical tools – a process that would culminate with his 
landmark book, Natural Inheritance (1889), which would be revered by both biometricians 
and Mendelians at the start of the twentieth century (MacKenzie 1981). Yet the 
experiments, and in particular their failure, despite Galton and Darwin’s optimism, were 
emblematic of something more general when it comes to the history of biosocial science: 
the gap between theories and the reality. Just five years earlier, in his first speculations on 
what he would later name “eugenics”, Galton (1883: 17) had written about his belief that 
the ultimate purpose of research on heredity was to create a “galaxy of genius” (Galton 
1865: 165). Pangenesis was certainly an indication of how important those dreams have 
been as motivations for studying heredity. But it also gave an insight into the kinds of 
problems that Galton and Darwin’s successors have run into since the early 1870s. 
Maurizio Meloni’s Political Biology (2016) reminds us of this episode because the 
founding moment of his own story of more than a century of debates about heredity is the 
rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s work on plant hybridization and its transformation into the 
foundations of modern genetics. The suggestion there was an identifiable, albeit still 
unobserved, physical unit for the transmission of characteristics and that the process 
followed a quantifiable pattern fuelled the idea that social questions had answers that were 
to some degree biological. Debates were focused on different issues, from immigration and 
race to class, in different places as the eugenics movements grew rapidly throughout Europe 
and North America during the first three decades of the 1900s. However, there was a 
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common thread running through all those discussions. The idea of the gene provided hope 
for people who believed that interventions at the biological level were necessary to either 
reverse processes like degeneration or to improve society further (Kevles 1985; Paul 1998; 
Soloway 1990).  
Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Mendel’s work did not stir in Galton the kinds of feelings 
he had experienced before the pangenesis experiments more than 30 years earlier. Galton 
(1883: 305) continued to believe that eugenics was at best a “Sisyphian task”, as he had 
described it for the best part of two decades. Mendel’s findings suggested to Galton that 
humans might be able to know more about their biological constitutions but their hopes of 
changing them permanently and rapidly according to some rationally designed plan were as 
weak as they had always been. The reason for Galton’s pessimism was not simply the 
knowledge deficit between the idea of genes and their real-world expression, it was a sense 
that biological and social temporalities might never be synchronised in the way that 
eugenicists’ hoped. Although he believed biological change could drive social progress he 
also thought that there were all kinds of challenges for anyone who claimed it was possible 
to eliminate “feeblemindedness” through practices such as sterilization. On the one hand, 
he argued there were legitimate questions about whether there the things considered 
defects today might turn out to be useful adaptations at some point in the future. On the 
other, he was convinced that the biggest problem was the idea that significant results could 
be achieved within a normal human life span.  
Galton was far from the only biosocial thinker to see things in these terms, of course. 
There was a significant gap between the eons of time biologists thought with, especially 
after 1859, and the timeframes that social reformers and politicians contemplated. Even the 
late nineteenth century’s most famous social evolutionist, Herbert Spencer, a utopian who, 
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as his life-long project, the Synthetic Philosophy, demonstrated, painted on a canvas as 
broad as anyone and struggled with the wilder expectations of his readership (Francis 2007). 
He argued that natural selection had severe limitations because its primary function was to 
serve as a reality check on groups and societies that tried to outgrow their natural limits. 
Instead, Spencer believed that real evolutionary progress came from processes underpinned 
by the Lamarckian mechanism of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which provided 
more scope for innovation and complex behaviour. The end point for Spencer – one that 
was countless generations away – was a state-less free society where order would be 
maintained by the mutually dependent relationships between individuals motivated by, 
among other things, a deep moral sense and altruistic social instincts (Dixon 2008).  
The question of the distance between biological and social temporalities is one of 
the biggest shadows cast by the late nineteenth century over the story told in Political 
Biology, which draws out the complex alignments between different ideas about 
evolutionary change and a range of political programmes since the late 1800s. As Meloni 
explains, biosocial science before the Second World War – the first half of the era he refers 
to as that of “hard heredity” – was dominated by eugenics, both in the “mainline” form that 
proved most popular in Germany and the USA and the “reform” strands that introduced 
greater sophistication into understandings of the relationship between nature and nurture. 
This was an era when there were divisions, particularly in political terms, over the question 
of the how to integrate biology into programmes for social reform. Yet there was also 
general agreement that nature had an important part to play (Kevles 1984; Paul 1998). 
Individuals were understood in terms of the groups they were a part of; thinkers on the left 
and right grew confident that they would soon possess the knowledge they required to 
reshape society and humankind according to their own goals (Meloni 2016: 32-135). 
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The realignment of biology, social science, and politics, captured in the famous 
UNESCO (1969) statements on race, after 1945 have usually been portrayed as the abrupt 
but timely end to those ways of thinking. According to the received view, widespread 
knowledge of what the Nazis had done in the name of racial hygiene served as the most 
prominent and disturbing example of a trend towards reductionism before 1939 and the 
idea that there was a quick biological fix to whatever problem people with power chose to 
see in the world. But, as Meloni suggests in his depiction of what he calls the second era of 
hard heredity, things were not quite so simple. On the one hand, ideas that proved 
important to the new sense of what society is, such as that race is a social rather than 
biological category, had been articulated clearly before 1939 (for example: Huxley and 
Haddon 1935). On the other hand, the continuation of hard heredity, seen most obviously in 
the fusion of genetics and natural selection in the modern evolutionary synthesis, meant 
that much of biology remained unchanged. What emerged as the settlement between those 
two points was in many ways indebted to Galton’s attitude to biological and social 
temporality at the start of the twentieth century.  
As Meloni points out, this settlement did not mean that interest in improving 
humankind via biology went away. Nevertheless, projects such as transhumanism, 
promoted by the likes of Julian Huxley, who was both an enthusiast for reform eugenics 
before the Second World War and one of the leading authors of the UNESCO statements on 
race, were configured in ways that were different to biosocial projects of the recent past 
(Renwick 2016). Echoing Galton’s concern that it was impossible to know what was and was 
not a useful adaptation, transhumanism married the new evolutionary biology’s view of 
diversity as the engine of progress with a belief that society could compensate for, rather 
than eliminate, the challenges that diversity created. Contrary to the thrust of criticisms 
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from the likes of Steven Pinker (2002), who targeted the straw man of a “standard social 
science model” in The Blank Slate, many social scientists, social reformers, and politicians 
were comfortable with hard heredity because its implication was that each generation 
started from scratch in biological terms. They channelled their efforts into constructing an 
environment where equality of opportunity, not outcome, might be achieved, with some 
kind of long-run biological pay off taken for granted. 
This new division of intellectual labour between biology, which focused on nature, 
and social science, which assumed authority over nurture, during the second half of the 
twentieth century was, as Meloni (2016: 23) argues, less a rejection of heredity as an 
important factor in politics and society and more a new political economy of biosocial 
science; a biopolitics with the kind of historical dimensions that Michel Foucault’s 
successors have often been happy to do without. Biosocial science was shorn of its most 
politically problematic branches, most obviously eugenics, but as Diane Paul (1998: 133-56), 
among others, has argued, this was done by devolving eugenic matters to individuals, who 
were asked to make decisions that earlier generations of eugenicists, working in Meloni’s 
first era of hard heredity, had imagined the state would need to take in the interests of the 
group. Progress would come with the help of tools such as genetic counselling but, as a 
consequence, it could not be expected to conform to predetermined political timeframes. 
One of the most important questions, from a British perspective, at least, is what we 
should take from Meloni’s account of this shift, in light of the fact that the three decades 
after the Second World War were also the golden age of the welfare state. The answer – 
and an important challenge to received views of Britain during the second half of the 
twentieth century – is that the welfare state was not based on a rejection of biosocial 
science but a genuine and considered political economy indebted to a Galtonian perspective 
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on the relationship between biological and social temporalities. This is a historiographic 
point with the potential to link the history of biosocial science with other big picture 
histories, given that historians of modern Britain have been asking challenging questions 
about where the 30 years after 1945 fits into narratives of the century as a whole. Whereas 
historians of science have come to call the 1900s “the century of the gene” (Keller 2000), 
political, social, and economic historians have pondered what has been described as “the 
brief life of its social democracy”, which was ended by the rise of neoliberalism from the 
mid-1970s onwards (Vernon 2010). Although Pinker’s sympathisers might argue that we 
should be writing the “short life of the standard social science model”, Political Biology 
makes clear that we should be making sense of how hard heredity persisted throughout 
these broader political and economic changes and what that teaches us about the current 
moment in biosocial science.  
It is in these respects that Meloni’s discussion of epigenetics takes on particular 
significance, both as the latest example of the contingent alignments between politics and 
biology and a field that, if history is any guide, will be the site for fresh battles amongst 
those who see biology as a root for social reform. Epigenetics has reopened the barrier 
between the biological and the social that had been closed during the two eras of hard 
heredity Meloni describes and, in the process, put the area of intersection up for discussion 
again. One possible consequence, according to some observers, is that social scientists will 
no longer be able to reason without biology, as they were able to throughout most of the 
twentieth century. Yet the political economy of that potential way of working is still very 
much emerging. There is a school of thought that suggests epigenetics could be the basis for 
a new social democracy, given its emphasis on the environment as a factor in development. 
But, as Meloni (2016: 188-223) warns, epigenetics does not rest on the idea of infinite 
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malleability or the idea, held by thinkers working in the lineage begun by August Weismann, 
that each generation starts afresh, freed from its parents’ mistakes. As such, epigenetics has 
the capacity to reintroduce eugenics, primarily by legitimating the idea that some people 
belong to groups that have been damaged through heredity.  
Once again, temporality is central to the discussion. With fluid boundaries between 
the environment and the genome, biological and social temporality have been fused into 
“development”, with the genome “subject to time and biography”, as Meloni (2016: 194) 
puts it. Although there is doubt about how stable some changes are in terms of transmission 
across generations, there is the kind of hope for epigenetics that usually accompanies such 
ambiguity. And it is with that hope that we reconnect with Galton and Darwin’s pangenesis 
experiments almost a century and a half ago, when a different theory of heredity 
encouraged interventionist thinking. As Meloni shows, what we are seeing with epigenetics 
is not the re-emergence of the idea that biology is a source of social progress but a renewed 
expectation that humans might be able to reshape biology within a politically convenient 
timeframe.      
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